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Russia plans drone factory in Belarus near NATO east borders
On March 6, 2025, Russia unveiled a proposal to construct a drone manufacturing facility in Belarus, a move that could significantly expand its production capacity for unmanned aerial vehicles amid the ongoing war in Ukraine.
Speaking at an exhibition of advanced Russian drones in Minsk, Maxim Oreshkin, the Kremlin’s deputy chief of staff, outlined a plan to build a plant capable of producing up to 100,000 drones annually. Belarusian President Alexander Lukashenko, present at the event, expressed enthusiasm for the initiative, signaling Minsk’s readiness to host the facility and collaborate with Moscow on its development.
The announcement, reported by Belarusian state media BelTA, comes as Russia seeks to bolster its technological and military edge, leveraging its close alliance with Belarus to extend production closer to NATO’s eastern flank. Though specifics such as the plant’s location and construction timeline remain under negotiation, the proposal underscores a deepening partnership between the two nations at a time of heightened regional tension.
Oreshkin framed the project as a step toward enhancing Belarus’s sovereignty, emphasizing that the factory would operate on a unified technological platform with Russian facilities, ensuring efficiency and scalability. “It’s critical for Belarus to have its own production capabilities, strengthening both its economy and security,” he told reporters, highlighting the potential for localizing key components within Belarus.
Lukashenko, in turn, assured his Russian counterparts of Minsk’s commitment, stating, “We are ready to build this plant, and I guarantee it will be done with quality unmatched in Russia.” He also proposed sending Belarusian specialists to Russia for advanced training in drone technology, a move aimed at accelerating the project’s implementation.
The exhibition showcased a range of Russian drones, from agricultural models to those resembling military designs like the Zala F-16 reconnaissance drone, though officials stopped short of confirming whether the plant would focus on civilian or combat systems. Discussions between Moscow and Minsk are expected to refine these details in the coming months, with consultations involving drone experts slated for April and May.
The context of this proposal is rooted in Russia’s broader strategy to sustain its military efforts in Ukraine, where drones have become a cornerstone of modern warfare. Since the conflict began in February 2022, Russia has leaned heavily on unmanned systems for reconnaissance, targeted strikes, and overwhelming Ukrainian defenses.
The proposed Belarusian facility would mark a significant expansion of Russia’s drone production network, which has grown steadily over the past three years. In September 2024, Russian officials claimed the country could already produce 1.4 million drones annually, primarily from sites deep within its territory, such as Tatarstan.
The Alabuga Special Economic Zone in Tatarstan, for instance, has emerged as a key hub, reportedly churning out thousands of Iranian-designed Shahed-136 drones—known in Russia as Geran-2—since 2023.
Leaked documents analyzed by Western outlets like The Washington Post suggest that Alabuga aimed to produce 6,000 Shaheds by mid-2025, a target it may have exceeded ahead of schedule, with Ukrainian intelligence estimating over 5,700 units manufactured in the first nine months of 2024 alone.
Beyond Alabuga, Russia has diversified its production efforts. Volunteer groups have supplemented official output with cheaper, improvised drones, often assembled in small workshops scattered across the country. In 2023, U.S. intelligence revealed that Iran was assisting Russia in building a drone factory in Yelabuga, Tatarstan, further illustrating Moscow’s reliance on foreign partnerships.
While Moscow has not detailed the types of drones slated for Belarus, their proximity to NATO borders—Poland, Lithuania, and Latvia lie just across Belarus’s western edge—raises questions about their intended use. Analysts note that Russia’s current arsenal includes both kamikaze drones like the Shahed-136, which carry explosive payloads for one-way missions, and reusable reconnaissance models like the Orlan-10, used for battlefield surveillance.
The role of drones in the Ukraine conflict cannot be overstated. Both sides have integrated these systems into nearly every facet of their operations, transforming the war into a proving ground for unmanned technology. Ukraine has deployed drones to strike deep into Russian territory, targeting fuel depots, factories, and even the Kazan Aircraft Plant in January 2025, which builds bombers used against Ukrainian cities.
Russia, meanwhile, has escalated its use of drones for mass attacks, launching barrages like the 111 Shaheds that struck Ukraine on New Year’s Eve 2024, killing civilians and testing Kyiv’s air defenses. The Ukrainian Air Force reported downing 63 of those drones, with others lost to electronic warfare or redirected into Russian and Belarusian airspace.
This reliance on drones has spurred an arms race, with production capacity emerging as a critical factor. Russia’s existing factories, while prolific, face challenges: sanctions have curtailed access to Western components, forcing reliance on Chinese suppliers for electronics and engines. The Alabuga plant, for example, uses materials from Russian and Belarusian firms for airframes, but its wings and propulsion systems trace back to companies like China’s Metastar and Beijing MicroPilot.
Ukraine, too, has ramped up production, with Turkish firm Baykar nearing completion of a factory near Kyiv by August 2025, expected to employ 500 workers and produce Bayraktar TB3 drones. Both nations aim to manufacture millions of units annually, a goal that underscores the war’s industrial scale. The proposed Belarusian facility, if realized, could tip the balance further, providing Russia with a forward-operating base to churn out drones at a rate rivaling its Tatarstan output.
These nations, alongside Estonia, are part of a six-country coalition planning a “drone wall” to monitor their borders, a project spurred by incidents like the 151 Russian Shaheds that veered into Belarusian airspace in November 2024, as reported by the Belarusian Hajun Project. The factory’s proximity could complicate NATO’s deterrence strategy, offering Russia a staging ground for drones that might target Ukraine or probe alliance defenses.
Belarus, already hosting Russian tactical nuclear weapons and air defense systems since 2022, would deepen its role as a Kremlin proxy, potentially straining its own relations with the West, where it faces sanctions for supporting Russia’s war efforts.
Yet the project’s implications extend beyond immediate security concerns. For Belarus, the factory promises economic benefits—jobs, technological transfer, and a stake in a burgeoning industry—while reinforcing its alignment with Russia under the Union State framework. For Moscow, it’s a chance to diversify production, mitigate the risks of Ukrainian strikes on inland sites, and project power closer to Europe.
As negotiations proceed, the Belarusian drone factory remains a proposal with vast potential and equally vast uncertainties. Its realization hinges on technical coordination, funding, and the political will of two leaders navigating a volatile landscape. For now, it stands as a symbol of Russia’s ambition to sustain its war machine and Belarus’s willingness to anchor that effort, a partnership poised to reshape the contours of a conflict that shows no sign of abating.
BulgarianMilitary