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Russia’s global war, north and south.
It is often said that Russia is opportunistic in its foreign policy, especially in the ‘global South’. So, for instance, Moscow jumped at the opportunity of gaining new partners in Burkina Faso, Mali and Niger by supporting their respective ruling juntas. Similarly, Russia is presenting itself as an unconditional partner to embattled leaders like those in Sudan in 2017 and in Saudi Arabia in 2018. Moreover, Russia increasingly partners with otherwise isolated regimes, notably its wartime ally North Korea, but also with Eritrea and Equatorial Guinea.
Still, focusing on opportunism can deflect attention from Moscow’s long-term partnerships. Chief among these is the 15-year-old BRICS, which in 2024 enlarged its membership to include Egypt, Ethiopia and Iran. Some Cold War-era bilateral relations survived the Soviet collapse, such as in Algeria, Angola and Vietnam. In other cases, substantial partnerships evolved since 1991 with countries that were not close Soviet partners, such as Mexico, Pakistan and Venezuela. Finally, some Cold War-era partnerships have been reactivated after a lull in the 1990s, such as with the Cuban, Iraqi and Nicaraguan governments.
Russia has sustained this global footprint into the 2020s despite the fallout from its full-scale war of aggression against Ukraine. To maintain this global reach, the Kremlin has been pro-active, and acted on three distinct directions: business ties, covert operations and disinformation. These ties sustain Russia’s claims to great power status and bring Russia’s war against Ukraine to the wider world.
Russian companies: vehicles for influence and elite capture
For European policymakers, Russia’s economy has represented a paradox for many years. It is, at the same time, smaller than Canada’s, resource-dependent and heavily sanctioned, but also relatively resilient, and features large companies with global scope. All of these companies are part of strategically important sectors, especially defence and energy.
Since the 2000s, Rostec — the Russian state-owned mega conglomerate — has been involved in the military modernisation programmes of Algeria, Venezuela, Vietnam, and other militaries supplied by Russia. Energy companies such as Gazprom, Lukoil, Rosneft and Tatneft have a combined 11 projects in Northern Africa, with dozens more worldwide. Rosatom — the state-owned nuclear power company — is building nuclear facilities of various types (73 projects in 29 countries), training specialists (in Russian systems), and supplying nuclear fuel to foreign plants.
Economic troubles and sanctions have had an impact in curtailing these global projects. Russian greenfield investment projects abroad went from over 50 in 2020 to just 18 between 2022 and 2024. In 2023, Moscow exported weapons to only 12 countries, a precipitous drop when compared to 31 in 2019.
Despite the decline, the global scope of Russian companies matters. The Kremlin often uses the international activities of state-owned and state-aligned Russian companies for ‘elite capture‘. This way, Moscow uses relatively small investments to gain a disproportionately large influence in certain governments, namely, by turning a blind eye when these funds are used by local politicians to sustain their patronage networks.
In turn, the captured incumbents become dependent on Russian funds and support, making them pliable to pressure from the Kremlin and less responsive to their local constituents. Russia can then use this leverage to advance its foreign policy goals (e.g. gain votes in regional fora or at the UNGA), to gain convenient deals for its state-controlled companies, or both. In addition, supporting authoritarian incumbents also advances the Kremlin’s preference for non-democratic governments and opposition to pro-democracy movements.
China’s government is also actively engaged in efforts for elite capture worldwide. Beijing’s playbook is similar to Russia’s, as it leverages investment and regime support to advance its foreign policy agenda and its own preference for autocracies. Disinformation campaigns and military cooperation also play a role, though Beijing’s media presence worldwide dwarfs that of Russia.
A notorious example was South Africa under then-President Jacob Zuma (2009−2018). In 2014, and shrouded in opacity, Zuma signed an agreement for Rosatom to develop several large nuclear plants in the country for an eye-watering 76 bn USD, to be financed by debt taken on by Pretoria. Zuma was partly motivated by personal enrichment to pursue the deal. (Another part was his unfounded belief that US intelligence was out to poison him.) Thanks to South Africa’s system of checks and balances and vibrant civil society, the deal was struck down.
Russian covert operations: Wagner and intelligence gathering
Besides business opportunities, Russia’s underlying bargain for local incumbents is to provide intelligence and military support under the cover of fighting against terrorism or drug trafficking. In exchange, local incumbents will adopt a pro-Russian foreign policy. Mining deals, antagonising the West, and advocating for Russia in regional fora are among the concrete gains the Kremlin obtains this way.
The covert element is crucial, as Russian armed deployments always operated with support from Russia’s powerful military intelligence, the Main Directorate of the General Staff (better known as the GRU in Russian). To this day, the infamous Wagner Group and its successors operate from the Molkino base of the GRU. While the full-scale invasion of Ukraine raised questions about the Kremlin’s ability to fund and staff Russian operations overseas, seven countries today have confirmed Russian deployments plus several more hosting Wagner-linked commercial and political operations.
Beyond these deployments, Russia has a global network of intelligence collection and covert operations. Part of this network is sustained by bilateral intelligence sharing deals with foreign governments. For instance, in Latin America, the Wagner Group was active in Venezuela in 2019, but Russian military presence never entirely left, though mostly focusing on covert intelligence work. Similarly, Cuba and Nicaragua host Russian officers whose activities are directed at gathering intelligence on the broader Caribbean region and the US.
Beyond intelligence gathering, covert ties have facilitated sanctions evasion. For example, secret trade channels have facilitated the repatriation of profits made by Russian companies selling oil to India, as well as use the funds for purchasing goods subject to exports control.
Other covert operations are less notorious but also insidious. Several Russian election monitoring organisations have turned out to be facades for intelligence collection and electoral meddling. Tricked exit polls, certifying illegitimate electoral results, and plain disinformation are part of the activities of these Russian organisations. According to the Africa Center, nearly half of the countries of Africa have been affected by Russian electoral meddling, effectively undermining local democracy. Similar moves have been afoot across Latin America and the Middle East.
Russian disinformation: konfliktologiya and strategic narratives
Russian disinformation campaigns are a type of covert operation, but they deserve a separate section. As a low-cost and low-risk measures, Russian state-controlled media, troll farms and local contractors can achieve strategic impact by influencing the way local decision- and opinion-makers frame issues. Russian embassies and cultural centres abroad also work as disinformation relays.
In Africa, Russia was found to be at the origin of 40% of all documented disinformation campaigns of recent years. Russia’s state-controlled outlet RT finds its largest audience abroad in Latin America. Most young people in the Middle East agree with the Russian narratives that the US and not Russia is to blame for the 2022 invasion of Ukraine. Russian strategic narratives find local support among state media and local audiences across Southeast Asia, too.
There are two dimensions to Russian disinformation abroad: conflict-generation and strategic narratives.
According to internal documents revealed by the US Department of Justice (DoJ), certain Russian actors involved in disinformation conceive their work as konfliktologiya, or the study for the generation of conflict. Indeed, the primary goal of Russian disinformation is to exploit societal cleavages and wedge issues to undermine trust in local and international institutions (especially in democratic states), and to support local partners who advance the Kremlin’s goals.
For example, in the Central African Republic, Russian campaigns targeted the local UN peacekeeping mission, MINUSCA, disseminating claims about human rights violations committed by the force. So, local Russian associates organised demonstrations and planted articles in local newspapers. Similar campaigns have targeted other UN missions, such as MONUSCO in the Democratic Republic of Congo and MINUSMA in Mali. The goal behind these campaigns is to legitimate the presence of Russian military deployments in Africa.
While the conflict-generation narratives can seemingly twist reality in endlessly new forms, there are common themes found throughout Russian disinformation campaigns. These themes amount to strategic narratives that advance Russian foreign policy: Russia is the righteous main victor in the Second World War, Russia is constantly a victim of international conspiracy, the US is an aggressor, and the West is decadent. (Chinese narratives also hinge on the CCP’s understanding — and tergiversations — of history but emphasise more the supposed accomplishments of China’s modernisation.)
These themes adapt and change according to the theatre and mission but remain consistent threads throughout. When engaging African counterparts, the Kremlin has increasingly relied on a narrative of ‘anti (neo)colonialism‘, which depicts Europe and the US as inherently colonial in their outlook towards African states. In Latin America, Russian narratives lean on regional anti-Americanism to portray Washington as possessive and intent to exploit the region’s natural wealth. Across the world, Russian disinformation also seeks to justify Russia’s full-scale aggression on the claim that the war aims to ‘denazify‘ Ukraine.
Fighting back
Corrupt dealings, covert operations, and disinformation are all part of Russia’s global influence and elite capture playbook, and all play a critical role in Russia’s great power aspirations. While this article focused on the countries of the ‘global South’, the reality is that all these instruments have been deployed by Russia across the ‘global North’, too. While there are no Wagner deployments inside NATO countries, the Czech foreign minister claimed that out of 500 suspicious incidents (sabotage, espionage, influence operations) across the European Union, Russian covert operations were likely behind about 100 of them. Russian elite co-option has also found a few successes, as does Russian disinformation.
To counter the Kremlin’s global campaign, Europe must start with ensuring its own security at home by fighting back against Russia’s shadow war. Globally, Europe should cooperate with those who have resisted Russian efforts at elite capture, especially among civil society and journalists. For example, the activities of organisations such as Code for Africa and Cazadores de fake news include exposing Russian disinformation campaigns in Africa and Latin America, respectively. Exposing the Kremlin’s corrupt dealings will go a long way to undermine Russia’s disinformation narratives about ‘neocolonialism’.
Beyond combating malign influence, Europe needs to continue presenting itself as a viable partner in trade and investment. Initiatives such as Global Gateway can play a pivotal role in competing with Russian companies internationally. To accompany these efforts with a narrative of equal partnership and pragmatic engagement with appeal to those governments that have espoused active non-alignment as their foreign policies.
