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‘I went to university with rebel leader Jolani – I wonder if he has really turned his back on jihad’
In 2004, a newly ascended Bashar al-Assad, eager to shield his regime from the blowback of the American invasion of Iraq, encouraged young Syrians and Muslims to cross into Iraq to resist the US occupation.
Among those who heeded the call was a soft-spoken 22 year-old named Ahmed al-Sharaa, a media student with middling grades and a quiet disposition. I was another student at Damascus that year, and the regime’s mobilisation at the university and elsewhere was not so subtle.
I remember being shocked when, during university break, a cab driver on my way to my village in Albu Kamal, near the Iraqi border, openly spoke about ferrying fighters to Anbar.
Two decades later, al-Sharaa played a pivotal role in toppling the regime that once urged him to jihad.
Born in 1982 to a displaced family from the occupied Golan Heights, al-Sharaa’s early life was emblematic of the aspirations of the Arab middle class. His father, a prominent economist, and his mother, a conservative geography teacher, moved the family to Saudi Arabia before returning to Syria in 1989.
According to Hussam Jazmati, a Syrian researcher who produced al-Sharaa’s most definitive biography, the parents’ home in the affluent Mazzeh Eastern Villas neighborhood symbolised their modest success, though young Ahmed remained introspective, his classmates recalling a studious but unremarkable boy who wore thick glasses and shied away from the limelight.
Militant ideology
As a teenager, he became increasingly political, his world view shaped by two pivotal events: the Palestinian Intifada in 2000 and the Sept 11 attacks in 2001.
The events of 2000 and 2001 radicalised the young man, steering him away from secular education towards religious devotion and militant ideology. By 2003, when the US invaded Iraq, al-Sharaa had abandoned his university studies, grown a beard and traded his student attire for the austere robes of a devout Salafi.
In March 2003, Ahmed al-Sharaa volunteered to fight against the American occupation in Iraq. Arriving in Baghdad weeks before its fall, according to Jazmati, he soon found himself in the turbulent Sunni stronghold of Ramadi.
This formative period exposed him to the chaos of war and introduced him to the burgeoning networks of jihadist fighters. It also set the stage for his later transformation.
Although unaligned with any major Iraqi factions at the time, he would cross the border back to Syria deeply influenced by the Salafi-jihadist ideology that would define his career.
Abu Ghraib prison
Following a brief interlude in Syria, where he narrowly avoided imprisonment during a crackdown on fledgling jihadist cells, al-Sharaa returned to Iraq in 2005.
This time, he joined a small insurgent group aligned with al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI). Captured in 2006 while planting a roadside bomb, he spent five years in U.S. military prisons, including Abu Ghraib and Camp Bucca.
These years were transformative. Al-Sharaa honed his strategic thinking and built alliances with future leaders of the Islamic State, including Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi.
By the time he was released in 2011, Ahmed al-Sharaa had become Abu Mohammad al-Jolani, a battle-hardened operative with a vision.
Turkmani, who had since become the governor of Nineveh under the Islamic State, was one of the few who knew Jolani’s Syrian roots. Together, they revisited discussions from prison about the potential for jihad in Syria.
Based on these conversations, Jolani drafted a comprehensive proposal for expanding the Islamic State’s influence into Syria. Turkmani personally submitted the plan to Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, the emir of the Islamic State. Baghdadi not only approved it but met with Jolani to outline the operational framework.
Sophisticated propaganda machine
By August 2011, Jolani had crossed into Syria with six trusted fighters, laying the groundwork for what would become Jabhat al-Nusra, a secret Syrian affiliate of the Islamic State of Iraq. Al-Baghdadi, according to his group’s own account years later, split their resources between the two groups equally.
Under Jolani’s leadership, Jabhat al-Nusra rapidly gained prominence, combining military prowess with a sophisticated propaganda machine. According to Jolani’s account to Al Jazeera, his group focused on projecting power by hitting high-profile targets, such as key security and military facilities or government officials, in different parts of the country.
His early strategy, emphasising alliances with local rebel factions and avoiding the brutal excesses of Isis, earned the group both territory and recruits.
By 2013, he formally pledged allegiance to al-Qaeda, after the Iraqi group unilaterally announced a merger between the two groups under Baghdadi’s sole rule.
To avoid the technicality of abandoning a pledge of allegiance (bayat) to Baghdadi, Jolani argued his ultimate oath was owed to al-Qaeda’s overall leader Ayman al-Zawahiri and before him, Osama bin Laden.
As the Syrian conflict dragged on, Jolani’s ambitions began to diverge from al-Qaeda’s global agenda.
In 2016, he formally severed ties with the organisation, rebranding his group as Jabhat Fatah al-Sham and later merging it into Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS). While critics saw the rebranding as cosmetic, it allowed Jolani to present HTS as a Syrian-focused organisation, distancing it from the transnational jihadist label.
By 2017, Jolani had consolidated power within HTS, emerging as its undisputed leader. Under his command, the grouping adopted a more pragmatic approach, engaging in local governance and seeking to legitimize itself as a political actor. This shift alienated hardline jihadists but won him cautious support from some elements of the Syrian opposition and even tacit acknowledgment from international actors wary of ISIS resurgence.
Late last month, a coalition of rebel forces, spearheaded by HTS and bolstered by tacit Turkish support, launched a surprise offensive that rapidly altered the Syrian conflict’s trajectory.
The operation, codenamed “Deterrence of Aggression,” began on Nov 27 and swiftly overwhelmed regime defences in key cities, first in Aleppo and Hama. The regime’s collapse was hastened by a breakdown in command and control, leading to minimal resistance as rebels advanced toward Homs and Damascus.
By Dec 8, Bashar al-Assad’s regime had crumbled, with reports indicating that the president had fled the country.
By Sunday, Syria’s new de-facto ruler remains a polarising figure – but mostly outside Syria.
To his supporters, Jolani is a shrewd tactician who helped liberate the country from dictatorship. To his detractors, he is a ruthless opportunist whose past affiliations and ideological shifts make him ill-suited to lead a country with cosmopolitan cities and diverse religious minorities.
Inside Syria, however, people’s mindsets appear to be elsewhere. For them, the overriding priority is to turn the page on the civil war and focus on rebuilding lives and communities.
After years of devastation, many Syrians view the unseating of Assad as a critical first step toward normalcy, and Jolani’s leadership so far has been marked by a surprising level of pragmatism.
The orderly rebel takeover, free of the chaos, vengeance, and infighting that have marred other conflicts in the region, has given some hope for a more stable future.
For now, Syrians seem cautiously optimistic, hoping that Jolani’s evolution from militant insurgent to pragmatic leader continues. The challenge ahead is enormous: to govern a fractured nation, maintain peace among competing factions and reconcile the scars of a decade-long civil war.
Whether Jolani can rise to meet these challenges will ultimately determine whether his transformation is genuine.