Russia in Review, Aug. 30-Sept. 6, 2024

7 Things to Know

1. Russia advanced on 477 square kilometers (184 square miles) of Ukrainian territory in August, Moscow’s biggest monthly increase since October 2022, according to data supplied by the Institute for the Study of War and analyzed by AFP. Meanwhile Ukrainian armed forces are solidifying to between 1,150 and 1,300 square kilometers of advances in Russia’s Kursk region, according to the data on claimed and confirmed troop movements reported by AFP. The most recent assessment by Ukraine’s DeepState OSINT said that as of Sept. 5, the Armed Forces of Ukraine (AFU) had regained positions in Niu York, Nelipivka and near Lyptsi, while Russian forces advanced near Pishchane, Stelmakhivka, Hirnyk, as well as in Kalynivka, Lisivka and Halytsynivka. This week saw the Russian military command continue to prioritize the offensive effort on the key hub of Pokrovsk in the Donetsk region, according to ISW, while AFU chief Oleksandr Syrskyi claimed on Sept. 6 that this offensive effort has not advanced in the past six days. The sides have also continued to exchange UAV, bomb and missile strikes this week, with Russian Iskanders hitting targets in Poltava on Sept. 3, killing 55 and injuring more than 270 in the deadliest strike this year, according to WSJ.
2. Polish Foreign Minister Radosław Sikorski has claimed that countries bordering Ukraine have a “duty” to shoot down Russian missiles before they enter their airspace despite the opposition of NATO, whose outgoing chief Jens Stoltenberg earlier rejected a proposal to consider intercepting in Ukraine’s airspace aerial vehicles fired in the direction of Poland’s territory. “Warsaw had an obligation to ensure the safety of its citizens irrespective of fears that interceptions over Ukrainian territory could embroil the Atlantic alliance in the war,” Sikorski argued in interview with FT this week. According to Stoltenberg’s July remarks, however, such interception would risk the alliance “becoming part of the conflict.” Some western officials say such a policy would blur red lines over western intervention and possibly prompt Russian retaliation, according to FT. Stoltenberg’s concern is most probably shared by the Biden administration, which remains determined to avoid being dragged into the actual war in spite of the ongoing campaign to expand NATO countries’ involvement in it.*
3. Vladimir Putin has twice referred to China as Russia’s ally in remarks he made at a school in Russia’s Tuva region en route to Mongolia (which he also called an ally as it rolled out a red carpet for the Russian leader in spite of an ICC arrest warrant). “The People’s Republic of China and the Russian Federation are allies in every sense of the word” and Russia should work with “our main partners and allies, including such a large and promising country… as the People’s Republic of China,” according to Putin—who hopes to host Xi Jinping at next month’s BRICS summit. As recently as last year, Putin denied plans to establish “some kind of a military-political alliance” with China, as did some of his top aides on earlier occasions (though some of them described the bilateral relations as being superior to that of allies). Moreover, Putin and Xi signed off on a declaration in March 2023 that said their countries are not in a “military-political alliance” [voyenno-politichesky soyuz], insisting that the bilateral relationship is superior to “such a form of interstate interaction.”  
4. Russia and Belarus are to sign a treaty on security guarantees and nuclear weapons in December 2024, according to Belarusian Foreign Minister Maxim Ryzhenkov. “We plan to sign an interstate treaty with Russia on security guarantees for the two countries, which will lay down the principle of using nuclear weapons and conventional weapons, as well as other methods of protecting both countries that are part of the Union State,” Ryzhenkov was quoted as saying by Kommersant on Sept. 2. It’d be interesting to see whether and how the “the principle of using nuclear weapons” in the treaty will differ from conditions for use of nuclear weapons outlined in Russia’s 2014 Military Doctrine and its 2020 Basic Principles of State Policy on Nuclear Deterrence. These differences (if any) may help to foresee what revisions of conditions for such use in Russian strategic documents, which Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Sergei Ryabkov and other Russian officials say is underway, will end up looking like.
5. Ukraine’s parliament has appointed a new wartime cabinet after Volodymyr Zelenskyy carried out the biggest overhaul of his government since Russia’s invasion, FT reported.¹ The Ukrainian leader justified the reshuffle by what he saw as a need to acquire “new energy,” but not every Ukraine watcher has been convinced by that explanation. Konstantin Skorkin of CEIP was rather harsh in his assessment of the reshuffle. “In the absence of elections, reshuffling within the government has become almost the only opportunity for the president to demonstrate at least some kind of changes in power and to uplift the spirit of the Ukrainian society. However, in reality, these reshuffles work towards even greater centralization and monopolization of power,” he wrote. “The lack of new faces and breakthrough ideas in the president’s team is being compensated for by a reshuffling of powers,” he added. The Economist believes Zelenskyy has culled the cabinet because his popularity has been fading.² This U.K. newspaper reported that the reshuffle in fact signals a “further consolidation of power around Zelenskyy’s influential chief of staff Andriy Yermak.” Yevhan Mahda, a Ukrainian political analyst, concurred with this assessment in his interview with NYT.³ The reshuffle could see “an increase of Yermak’s influence,” he warned.
6. This week has seen a flurry of activity by U.S. authorities to go after Russian individuals and entities that they suspect of interfering in America’s electoral affairs. FT reported that the U.S. Department of Justice is seizing dozens of websites allegedly used by the Russian government to spread disinformation in an effort to meddle with the presidential election, and WSJ pointed to deputy chief of Putin’s staff Sergei Kiriyenko as the alleged curator of the seized domains. However, as Kiriyenko is already under sanctions, it was employees and editors of Russia’s RT propaganda outlet that were sanctioned by the U.S. Treasury for seeking to influence the 2024 U.S. presidential election this week, according to AFP. Moreover, WSJ reported that the Biden administration accused Putin himself of orchestrating a covert campaign to influence the coming U.S. presidential election. Unfazed by the accusations, a smiling Putin claimed this week that he would be supporting Kamala Harris. “I don’t know if I’m insulted or he did me a favor,” Trump said of Putin’s remarks as Bloomberg reported that “the view that has crystallized in Moscow, according to five people familiar with the latest thinking in the Kremlin, is that there really isn’t much reason to raise a glass if Trump returns to the White House.”
7. Russia’s budget deficit declined to just 331 billion rubles ($3.7 billion) or 0.2% of GDP for the first eight months of the year, according to Bloomberg.  Russia recorded a budget surplus of 767 billion rubles ($8.5 billion) in August, thanks to almost 1 trillion rubles of increased revenue from non oil-and-gas sectors compared to July, this news agency reported. The Russian government’s revenues from taxes on oil and gas surged too, totaling 778.6 billion rubles ($8.7 billion) last month, up by 21% from a year ago, according to Bloomberg. In good news for Russian consumers, consumer prices in the week through Sept. 2 fell 0.02%, according to data from the Federal Statistics Service release, this news agency reported. On the negative side, S&P Global’s Purchasing Managers’ Index for Russian manufacturing fell to 52.1 last month compared to 53.6 in July, according to MT.

Read more

5 Ideas to Explore

1. Has Vladimir Putin just signaled Russia’s readiness to enter a formal alliance with China? If so, Putin chose a rather remote location and a modest venue to do so. “The People’s Republic of China and the Russian Federation are allies [soyzniki]  in every sense of the word,” Putin told schoolchildren during a visit to a school in the capital of Russia’s Tuva region on Sept. 2. Russia should work with “our main partners and allies, including such a large and promising country… as the People’s Republic of China,” he said during a stopover to Mongolia (which he also called an ally). As recently as last year, Putin denied plans to establish “some kind of a military-political alliance” with China, as did some of his top aides on earlier occasions (though some of them described the bilateral relations as being superior to that of allies). Moreover, Putin and Xi Jinping signed off on a declaration in March 2023 that said their countries are not in a “military-political alliance” [voyenno-politichesky soyuz], insisting that the bilateral relationship is superior to “such a form of interstate interaction.” That Putin would now describe China as Russia’s ally twice during the same event could be a signal to Xi Jinping that Russia is open to entering a formal alliance with Beijing (if the latter decides to abandon what WoR contributors described as “China’s Non-Alliance Policy“).*
2. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy has come under a “barrage of criticism… over the rapid advances” the Russian army is making in the direction of the strategically important city of Pokrovsk,¹ while Ukraine’s own offensive in Russia’s Kursk region is culminating, according to FT and the Economist. Acknowledging the threat to Pokrovsk, Zelenskyy described the situation on the frontline near this Donetsk region city as “extremely difficult,” but claimed that the Russian advance in the area had slowed following the launch of Ukraine’s offensive in Kursk on Aug. 6, FT reported. However, according to several military analysts Russian forces have advanced more rapidly in the Donetsk region since Aug. 6 compared with previous months, FT reported. Roman Pohorilyi of Ukraine’s Deep State OSINT project described the fall of key towns such as Novohrodivka and the looming threat to the nearby  Pokrovsk as “complete chaos,” while Oleksandr Kovalenko of Kyiv-based Information Resistance group called the situation on the eastern edge of this city “a complete defensive failure,” according to FT.² If Pokrovsk were to fall, it could pave the way for Russian forces to push toward Dnipro, Ukraine’s fourth-largest city, according to FT and The Times of London. Beyond the situation at the front, Russia’s strike campaign against Ukraine’s energy grid is an even bigger problem, according to Michael Kofman of CEIP and Rob Lee of FPRI. In their analysis of the recent developments in the Russian-Ukrainian war, Kofman, Lee and Steven Pifer of Brookings have argued that the Kursk incursion has raised morale among Ukrainian troops. 
3. A decisive change in the course of the war is unlikely if U.S. and its allies permit Ukraine to use Western-made systems for deep strikes inside Russia, according to Stephen Biddle of Columbia University. If given such permission, Ukraine could strike distant logistical and command targets, including even the Kremlin, and defense enterprises “would reduce the efficiency of Russia’s offensives,” Biddle writes in FA. In addition, “damaging factories or infrastructure inside Russia” in such strikes “might help boost Ukrainian morale… But even if the West lifts its restraints on Ukrainian deep strike capability, the consequences are unlikely to include a decisive change in the trajectory of the war,” he argued shortly before U.S. was reported to be considering transfer of long-range missiles to Ukraine.³ For one, deep strike systems are expensive, while their precision guidance systems are vulnerable to disruption by countermeasures. In addition, Ukraine would need to deploy its new capabilities on a large scale and all at once, which would be problematic, according to Biddle. Thus, “Kyiv’s partners should now ask whether the modest military benefits are worth the escalatory risk,” Biddle writes of deep strike systems.
4. How can the war in Ukraine end? Is a negotiated settlement possible? What would it take to achieve it? In her review of 25 peace proposals for RM, Colgate University’s Masha Hedberg examines the range of options and assesses their viability as blueprints for ending the war, concluding that there is no clear-cut answer to ending the war in Ukraine in a way that is just, expeditious and long-term. “Whether considering total victory or negotiated settlements, each approach offers different trade-offs and possibilities. The ‘peace through strength’ scenarios, while appealing in their clarity, may be impractical given the dynamics on the ground,” Hedberg writes. “On the other hand, proposals for negotiated settlements present creative solutions but often require compromises that will not satisfy all parties involved. But perhaps by focusing on the possibilities rather than just the limitations, the international community may yet discover a path to meaningful progress,” according to Hedberg.
5. “For the first time in Russian history… prominent figures [in Russia]… are openly advocating the preventive use of nuclear weapons to ensure the success of the special military operation in Ukraine,”⁴ Aleksey Arbatov of Russia’s IMEMO writes in reference to “the conflict in and around Ukraine.” Moreover, “for only the fourth time in history, Western nations are collectively opposing Russia and indirectly (so far) participating in the conflict,” according to Arbatov’s article in Polis. Political Studies, republished by RIAC. However, Arbatov sees some silver lining in the current crisis as well. “Even amid violent conflicts between states, arms control has a certain stabilizing effect on the confrontation. It is worth noting that despite the severity of the Ukrainian crisis and the widespread discussion of a possible nuclear escalation in Russia and abroad, U.S. and Russian strategic forces are left out of this discourse,” he writes.

Read more

Production of the Russia-Ukraine War Report Card is currently on hold. Please see below for the most recent issue. You can also access past issues via the Russia-Ukraine War Report Card archive. 

July 16 update:

July 16 update: No significant territorial changes. NATO members pledged to sustain steady military aid for Ukraine through next year at $44 billion minimum. Net territorial change in the past month: Russia +56 square miles.