A Southeast Asian BRICS view in the Trump era.
Washington’s 2025 tariff shock accelerates Southeast Asia’s turn toward BRICS for geopolitical and economic alternatives, though not without risk.
- Trump policies shatter multilateralism, pushing the Global Majority to BRICS
- Southeast Asian nations look to diversify alliances and hedge global risks
- Autocratic tendencies in BRICS raise concerns for democratization efforts
If a date had to be identified for the demise of the post-World War II international system, it was April 2, 2025. On that day – so-called “Liberation Day” – United States President Donald Trump announced universal “reciprocal” tariffs to a shocked global audience. The blatantly protectionist move was equivalent to the U.S. abandoning the very rules-based international order that it, ironically, had helped construct and uphold over the past eight decades.
What comes now is a dangerous era of absolute advantage in global trade, investment and finance, bent on unilateralism over multilateralism, competition over cooperation, nationalism over interdependence, and the singular quest to dominate and reshape the worldwide pecking order under the rubric of making America “great again.”
For developing countries in Southeast Asia, this is an existential period of staying on their toes and trying to survive. Even prior to the second Trump administration, these nations had been diversifying and rebalancing amid the intensifying geostrategic confrontation between the U.S. and China. President Trump’s aggressive and antagonistic policy posture will likely push Southeast Asia to look for other platforms of cooperation and development, within the “Global South” context and particularly the BRICS grouping, initially comprising Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa.
BRICS growth suddenly mushroomed
Originally established in 2006, this club of countries welcomed only four new members by 2023: Egypt, Ethiopia, Iran and the United Arab Emirates. As global shifts, following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 and subsequent sanctions, convinced some developing countries of Western dominance, by October 2024 at its 16th summit in Russia’s southwestern city of Kazan, BRICS had registered nine “partner countries,” though some of them did not support Russian aggression. They are Belarus, Bolivia, Cuba, Indonesia, Kazakhstan, Malaysia, Thailand, Uganda and Uzbekistan. Indonesia acceded to BRICS formally as a member in January 2025.
For Southeast Asia, BRICS provides geostrategic space beyond the cut-and-thrust of global politics from Russia’s war on Ukraine and the U.S.-China confrontation, as well as the Israeli conflicts in the Middle East with Hamas, Hezbollah and Iran. In particular, Israeli actions in the Middle East pose a longstanding and critical concern to Malaysia and Indonesia, the latter country having the largest population of Muslims in the world.
As a fast-growing region in the world economy with half the market size of China and a combined gross domestic product (GDP) of nearly $4 trillion, and one lying at an intersection of insecurity and prosperity in the Indo-Pacific, Southeast Asia broadly sees BRICS as a mixed bag.
Varying levels of interest in BRICS
On the one hand, the BRICS platform offers geopolitical leverage vis-a-vis the West, despite limited geoeconomic benefits.
The Philippines has been the most reluctant to join because Manila sees China’s influence all over BRICS. The archipelagic state, a member of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), has been contesting China’s maritime grabs in the South China Sea, with Manila putting up a strong fight under President Ferdinand “Bongbong” Marcos Jr. The Philippines relies heavily on its alliance with the U.S. and on Washington standing up to China. A Philippine entry into BRICS could undermine the goodwill and support of the U.S., which opposes the pro-Global Majority club’s momentum and direction.
In 2023, Cambodia, Laos and internally war-torn Myanmar, unlike the Philippines, expressed an interest in affiliating themselves with BRICS.
Cambodia is concerned that its support for United Nations sanctions against Russia due to Moscow’s aggression would render its BRICS interests futile. Yet, looking at the examples of Indonesia, Malaysia and Thailand, signing on to UN resolutions against Russia does not preclude a BRICS role. And as Cambodia is already within China’s geopolitical orbit in mainland Southeast Asia, Phnom Penh is interested in joining as a partner rather than a member.
The potential entry of Laos, which is one of only two Southeast Asian countries, alongside Vietnam, to have abstained on all major UN resolutions against Russia, is understandable. With a population of 7.6 million and a GDP of $15 billion, this small landlocked country is heavily indebted to China for infrastructure loans. In fact, Laos is often seen as a Chinese vassal state doing Beijing’s bidding.
On the other hand, Myanmar does not have clear state representation. Senior General Min Aung Hlaing, leader of the junta that seized power in February 2021 under the State Administration Council, is not accepted by all fellow ASEAN heads of government and therefore is not included in their summit meetings. In addition, Myanmar’s ambassador to the UN remains the same representative from the pre-coup, democratically elected government under Aung San Suu Kyi’s National League for Democracy party. Consequently, Myanmar’s stated interest in joining BRICS, either as a member or partner, is problematic.
At the other end of the regional spectrum, Singapore is unlikely to apply because the affluent island state has imposed sanctions on Russia for its invasion of Ukraine. As the BRICS accession process operates on consensus, any of the five core members could reject applicants. In Singapore’s case, this would be Russia. The tiny sultanate of Brunei has not taken a stand on the grouping. That leaves four pivotal Southeast Asian countries that are important for BRICS in the region: Indonesia, Malaysia, Thailand and Vietnam.
Indonesia’s logic for BRICS membership
Indonesia initially refrained from expressing interest but changed its tune after the country’s February 2024 general election. Under President Prabowo Subianto’s government, which projects an internationalist outlook, the country became a BRICS member earlier this year. Indonesia plays a crucial role in ASEAN and the G20, and Jakarta wants to “diversify” its geostrategic options further, with BRICS membership considered another major stage for global influence. With ASEAN divided on issues such as Myanmar’s civil war and maritime issues in the South China Sea, Indonesia will likely not want to be held back by the regional organization. BRICS allows Jakarta to move forward on the world stage, especially as its president is an internationalist at heart.
BRICS, as a predominantly Global Majority grouping beyond Western powers, will not be alien to Indonesia, which, like India, is non- or multi-aligned, notwithstanding prickly issues in Indonesia-China relations and Russian expansionism. In addition, Indonesia’s solidarity with Palestine amid the Israeli conflicts in the Middle East also boosts its interest in the grouping.
Indonesians are generally critical of Israeli actions in the Middle East and sympathize with the plight of the Palestinians. Unsurprisingly, Indonesia and Israel do not have official diplomatic relations. Moreover, Indonesia holds high hopes for joining the 38-member Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) as a way of promoting economic reforms and development progress. Such a move, however, could be complicated by Israel’s membership in this group of developed countries and the potential opposition generated by Tel Aviv.
Malaysia as a BRICS partner
Malaysia is in a similar position. As the ASEAN chair in 2025, Malaysia wants to maximize its international role and geostrategic projection. Having consolidated political power under a coalition government and with an eye toward reelection, Prime Minister Anwar Ibrahim wants to make the most of his international engagements and leverage them for domestic electoral dividends. In his fourth decade in politics, with many bumps along the way, Prime Minister Anwar may also want to leave a statesmanlike legacy partly built on the partnership with BRICS.
Like Indonesia, Malaysia is critical of Israel and does not have formal relations with the Jewish state, prioritizing a focus on the Myanmar civil war and not viewing Russia’s war in Ukraine as the most pressing issue for ASEAN’s attention. And due to Malaysia’s firm position on Israel and the West’s support for Israel, partnering with BRICS has added value for Kuala Lumpur.
It is not surprising that both Indonesia and Malaysia have recently promoted greater cooperation with China, thanks to Prime Minister Anwar’s meeting with Chinese President Xi Jinping in Beijing in November 2024 and President Prabowo’s agreeing to joint exploration with China in an adjacent seaway previously thought to be under Indonesian sovereignty.
Thai trajectory in BRICS and the OECD
Thailand was at the forefront of the BRICS wave before the rest of Southeast Asia. Under the leadership of then Prime Minister Srettha Thavisin, in late May 2024, Thailand formally announced a decision to work with the group and Foreign Minister Maris Sangiampongsa travelled to Russia shortly thereafter to officially register Thailand’s application. Bangkok also seeks to join the OECD. The explanation behind the Thai government’s application to become a BRICS partner is its intention to demonstrate a quick deliverable in the absence of policy progress.
Another reason behind the hasty move is domestic consumption. Prime Minister Srettha had made little headway in entering the OECD and his government’s domestic agenda was stymied and stuck. BRICS came into play for domestic audiences as a deliverable achievement and a quick win, and Thailand became a BRICS partner country in January of this year. This policy expediency continued under Prime Minister Paetongtarn Shinawatra when Thailand inked the OECD application in May while domestic political squabbling persisted.
Trump 2.0, BRICS and Southeast Asia
The attraction and momentum of BRICS depend significantly on U.S. policy posture. Under President Joe Biden, BRICS became a kind of shelter for Russia after its Ukraine invasion and consequent international condemnations and sanctions. This is why the sudden burst of BRICS activities and discussions, including the concrete additions of new members and partners, took place between 2022 and 2024. In the era of Russia’s ongoing war and resulting sanctions, countries seeking to coordinate with Global Majority peers in the formation of a geopolitical bloc with potential geoeconomic benefits have lined up for the BRICS partner country framework.
As President Biden’s term expired and President Trump took over in a second administration in January 2025, BRICS was given a further boost. Even before being inaugurated, Mr. Trump shook up the global economic system with drama and fanfare unlike any other major leader in recent memory.
One of his outbursts was a pledge to slap a 100 percent tariff on BRICS countries if they were to try to further “de-dollarize” and come up with an alternative global reserve currency. The issue of dollar hegemony and its status as the default global reserve currency has been a sticking point for Global Majority countries as well as other developing nations for decades.
The resentment against dollar dominance in the global economy became more acute since Russia launched its war on Ukraine, which has resulted in sanctions that some perceive as “weaponizing” Western industrial, trade and monetary policies. Developing countries, including those in the BRICS grouping, see it as bullying and double standards in view of what Israel, for example, has been carrying out in its conflicts in the Middle East.
Facts & figures
BRICS timeline
President Trump’s tariff threat, including his reciprocal tariffs that hit Vietnam especially hard, did not go down well in Southeast Asia. In fact, Southeast Asian countries were among the hardest hit by the proposed tariffs – from 10 percent for Singapore up to 49 percent for Cambodia. This confirmed a BRICS talking point that Global Majority countries need to organize on their own to reduce dependence on the weight of the U.S. economy and its currency.
For all these reasons, Vietnam – holder of the largest trade surplus with the U.S. among Southeast Asian economies, and careful in its diplomatic engagement with both China and the U.S. − became the 10th BRICS partner country in mid-June.
Further U.S. weaponization of trade policy and its geoeconomic toolkit will likely push more Global Majority countries in this direction for fear of excessive reliance on U.S. trade and investment and being punished for it when Washington deems fit. The new BRICS partners clearly see the grouping as an insurance policy amidst geoeconomic and geopolitical turbulence, underpinned by a broad breakdown of the rules-based international order.
Partnership in BRICS also allows participating countries to access loans from the Shanghai-headquartered New Development Bank, and to benefit from the group’s trade and investment opportunities.
BRICS carries risks, and the U.S. is still the biggest economy
To be sure, while BRICS serves as a proactive hedge and leverage against worsening global uncertainty, membership or even partnership risks taking Southeast Asian states in directions where they should not be heading and have little say. As a founding member, Russia is conducting the fourth year of its grueling war in Ukraine and China has locked horns with the U.S. As a new member, Iran and its proxies are in a hot war with Israel.
Malaysia, Thailand and Vietnam will have to consider the elevation of partnership to full membership carefully. The U.S. under Trump in his second term can still wield enormous clout geoeconomically as well as geopolitically.
A longstanding U.S. treaty ally, Thailand has been leaning more toward Beijing with its domestic turn to autocracy in view of two military coups over the past two decades, although the elected government of Prime Minister Paetongtarn appears to have regained a semblance of democratic rule.
Similarly, Indonesia and Malaysia have promoted closer ties with China but not at the expense of their relations with the U.S. In other words, when push comes to shove, Southeast Asian partners and members of BRICS will likely consider Washington’s threats and preferences seriously.
Scenarios
Likely: Democracies in BRICS will face autocratic pressures
Tensions and clashes from the autocratic heart of BRICS could be exploited by certain members and thereby drag the whole group into murky and precarious directions. BRICS largely comprises autocratic regimes, notwithstanding India’s role as the largest democracy in the world. Being in such an autocratic club could adversely affect Southeast Asia’s democratization prospects.
Three regional BRICS members and partners so far – Indonesia, Malaysia and Thailand – are delicate democracies that require institutional nurturing and safeguarding to further consolidate. Vietnam, while communist, has a market-based economy. Associating with the likes of Belarus and Russia cannot be conducive to further democratization and free-market economic development in Southeast Asia.
The autocracy-dominated and divergent regime types in BRICS between India and China/Russia may also impede further cooperation and collaboration down the road. This would make, for example, alignment and convergence on de-dollarization goals more difficult and unwieldy.
Equally likely: Global economic opportunities will determine the bloc’s direction
Much in the medium term will depend on what the second Trump administration ultimately does. If President Trump goes too far with his tariff actions, then BRICS will likely become more appealing as a bulwark against U.S. belligerence and economic nationalism behind protectionism and mercantilism.
For Southeast Asia, this would mean doing more business, trade, investment, tourism and technology adoption with China. But if the 47th president of the U.S. treats tariffs as part of a geostrategic package rather than a unilateral imposition in a sweeping manner, then developing economies and smaller powers within BRICS and elsewhere will likely be in less of a hurry to speed up the bandwagon that was set up nearly two decades ago. Put another way, BRICS is externally driven rather than internally shaped.
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Gis reports