USS Cape St. George back in San Diego after $601M refit fiasco.
On April 22, 2025, the USS Cape St. George, a Ticonderoga-class guided-missile cruiser, glided into its homeport of San Diego, California, its sleek hull cutting through the Pacific waters under a clear spring sky.
The ship’s arrival marked the end of an extraordinary journey—not one of combat or deployment, but of an 8.5-year modernization process that cost the U.S. Navy over $601 million. For the sailors lining the deck and the onlookers at the pier, the cruiser’s return was a moment of pride, a testament to the Navy’s engineering prowess.
Yet, beneath the polished exterior lies a stark reality: this overhaul, one of the longest and most expensive in recent naval history, will grant the ship only a single deployment before its planned retirement in fiscal year 2027.
Why did it take nearly a decade and such a staggering sum to prepare a warship for so brief a final act? The answer reveals a saga of ambition, miscalculation, and systemic challenges that have left the Navy grappling with tough questions about its aging fleet.
The USS Cape St. George, commissioned in 1993, is among the youngest of the Ticonderoga-class cruisers, a fleet of 27 warships designed in the late Cold War era to dominate the seas. These ships are engineering marvels, built around the Aegis Combat System, a sophisticated network of radars, computers, and weapons that can detect, track, and engage multiple threats simultaneously.
With 122 vertical launch system [VLS] cells, the Cape St. George can unleash a formidable arsenal, including Tomahawk cruise missiles for land strikes, Standard Missiles for air defense, and ASROC rockets for anti-submarine warfare. Its two Mark 45 5-inch guns, Harpoon anti-ship missiles, and Phalanx close-in weapon systems round out its offensive and defensive capabilities.
The ship’s versatility has made it a cornerstone of carrier strike groups, providing air defense, surface warfare, and command-and-control functions. Over its three decades of service, the Cape St. George has earned its stripes, supporting Operation Iraqi Freedom in 2003, where it fired missiles from both the Mediterranean and the Persian Gulf, and aiding humanitarian efforts off Pakistan in 2010. Its storied career, however, has not shielded it from the wear of time or the complexities of modernization.
The modernization of the Cape St. George began in December 2016 at Vigor Marine’s shipyard in Seattle, Washington, with the goal of extending the cruiser’s service life by five years, pushing its retirement into the early 2030s.
The plan was ambitious: upgrade the Aegis system with new software and hardware, install the AN/SPQ-9B radar for enhanced surface detection, modernize the SQQ-89A[V]15 sonar for better anti-submarine warfare, and overhaul the ship’s hull, mechanical, and electrical systems to combat decades of corrosion and wear. The Navy initially estimated the process would take four years and cost significantly less than the final tally.
By the time the ship returned to San Diego, however, the timeline had doubled, and costs had ballooned to $601.39 million, according to a December 2024 Government Accountability Office [GAO] report. The reasons for this overrun are a case study of the challenges of maintaining an aging fleet in an era of rapid technological change.
From the outset, the modernization faced significant hurdles. The Cape St. George, like many Ticonderoga-class cruisers, had accumulated years of deferred maintenance, a consequence of high operational tempos during the post-9/11 wars.
Corrosion in the hull and degraded mechanical systems required extensive repairs beyond what planners had anticipated. “The Navy did not effectively plan the cruiser effort,” the GAO report stated, noting that “a high volume of unplanned work—9,000 contract changes—resulted in cost growth and schedule delays.” The integration of new technologies, such as upgraded Aegis software and radar systems, proved more complex than expected, requiring additional time to ensure compatibility with the ship’s existing infrastructure.
Vigor Marine, the primary contractor, faced workforce shortages and a lack of specialized expertise, further slowing progress. The ship’s transfer to San Diego for additional work in 2021 added logistical challenges, as components and personnel had to be coordinated across multiple sites.
These issues were not unique to the Cape St. George; the broader Cruiser Modernization Program, which targeted seven ships, saw similar problems, with four cruisers—USS Hué City, USS Anzio, USS Vicksburg, and USS Cowpens—decommissioned after $1.84 billion in incomplete upgrades.
The financial toll of the Cape St. George’s modernization raises questions about its value. At $601.39 million, the overhaul cost nearly as much as a new Flight III Arleigh Burke-class destroyer, which carries 96 VLS cells and boasts advanced radar systems like the AN/SPY-6.
The Navy’s investment was meant to buy five additional years of service, yet the ship is now slated for decommissioning in 2027, just two years after its return. This limited return has sparked criticism, with observers on platforms like X calling the effort a “$650 million refit for an outdated ship.”
The GAO report echoed these concerns, noting that the three successfully modernized cruisers—USS Gettysburg, USS Chosin, and Cape St. George—will collectively add only 10 years of service life for a combined $1.9 billion. From a financial perspective, the program’s efficiency is dubious; the Navy could have invested in newer platforms or emerging technologies like unmanned vessels or hypersonic missiles for a fraction of the cost.
Operationally, modernization delivers tangible benefits. The upgraded Aegis system enhances the Cape St. George’s ability to counter modern threats, such as advanced anti-ship missiles and drones, which have proliferated in regions like the Middle East and South China Sea.
The ship’s participation in testing the Transferrable Reload At-sea Mechanism [TRAM] in October 2024, a system that allows missile canisters to be reloaded at sea, adds a new dimension to its flexibility. “The TRAM demonstration was the first time the Navy transferred missile canisters from a replenishment ship to a warship while at sea,” Navy Secretary Carlos Del Toro said in a November 2024 statement.
This capability reduces reliance on port visits, a critical advantage in contested waters. The cruiser’s 122 VLS cells also give it a firepower edge over destroyers, which typically carry 96. Yet, these advantages are tempered by the reality that Flight III Arleigh Burke destroyers, with their superior radar and lower maintenance costs, are nearly as capable. The Cape St. George’s final deployment will likely showcase its enhanced systems, but whether this justifies the investment remains debatable.
Strategically, the modernization reflects a broader dilemma facing the Navy: how to maintain a robust fleet amid delays in new shipbuilding programs. The Ticonderoga-class cruisers were meant to be replaced by the CG[X] cruiser program, which was canceled in 2010 due to budget constraints.
The next-generation DDG(X) destroyer, intended to succeed both cruisers and older destroyers, is not expected to enter service until the mid-2030s. In the interim, the Navy has leaned on modernized cruisers and destroyers to fill the gap, a decision driven partly by congressional pressure.
Lawmakers, wary of reducing fleet size during a period of growing Chinese naval power, rejected the Navy’s 2012 proposal to retire the cruisers early, mandating the modernization program instead. “The Navy’s CG retirement plans will create a VLS cell bathtub in the fleet right as we enter a period of heightened risk with China,” Rep. Rob Wittman warned in a 2023 statement to Navy Times. This strategic necessity underscores why the Navy persisted with the Cape St. George’s overhaul, despite its escalating costs.
Comparing the U.S. approach to other naval powers highlights both unique challenges and potential lessons. France, for instance, modernizes its Horizon-class frigates in two to three years at a cost of $200-300 million per ship, thanks to modular designs that simplify upgrades.
Germany’s Sachsen-class frigates undergo similar overhauls in 18-24 months for about $150 million, though these ships are smaller and less complex. Japan, a close U.S. ally, upgrades its Atago-class destroyers, which also use the Aegis system, in two to three years for roughly $200 million, focusing on radar and missile enhancements.
These nations benefit from newer hulls and streamlined shipyard processes. China, by contrast, prioritizes building new ships like the Type 055 destroyer, which rivals the Ticonderoga-class in capability and can be constructed in under three years for an estimated $900 million.
Russia’s modernization of the Kirov-class cruiser Admiral Nakhimov, however, mirrors the U.S. experience, with over a decade of work and costs exceeding $2 billion, driven by ambitious upgrades and industrial inefficiencies. The U.S. faces a unique bind: its cruisers are older and more complex than most foreign equivalents, and its shipyards grapple with higher labor costs and workforce shortages.
The human element of the Cape St. George’s journey adds depth to the story. Sailors and shipyard workers endured years of uncertainty as the modernization dragged on. Crew morale, particularly on ships like the USS Vicksburg, suffered as delays mounted, with one House Armed Services Committee aide describing the Vicksburg’s state as “a damn dumpster fire” in a 2023 Navy Times report.
For the Cape St. George’s crew, the return to San Diego was a moment of relief, but also a reminder of the fleeting time left to prove the ship’s worth. Engineers at Vigor Marine, meanwhile, faced the daunting task of reviving a 30-year-old warship, a process one shipyard worker described as “like rebuilding a classic car while it’s still driving.” These perspectives underscore the dedication behind the project, even as its outcomes fell short of expectations.
Historically, the Ticonderoga-class cruisers have been a linchpin of U.S. naval power, their Aegis systems revolutionizing fleet defense during the 1980s and 1990s. The Cape St. George’s combat record, from missile strikes in Iraq to anti-piracy operations off Somalia in 2006, reflects this legacy. Yet, the modernization saga reveals a Navy caught between past glory and future uncertainty.
The program’s failures—$1.84 billion spent on four decommissioned cruisers—have prompted reforms, with the Navy applying lessons to the Arleigh Burke-class destroyer modernization effort, known as DDG Modernization 2.0. “The DDG modernization effort is based on lessons learned from the cruiser modernization effort,” Capt.
Tim Moore, program manager for DDG Modernization 2.0, said at the 2024 Sea Air Space conference. These lessons include better planning, clearer oversight, and a phased approach to upgrades.
The USS Cape St. George’s return to service is a bittersweet milestone. It represents a triumph of engineering and perseverance, but also a cautionary tale of what happens when ambition outpaces planning.
The Navy’s decision to extend the ship’s life to 2029, alongside USS Gettysburg and USS Chosin, buys time to bridge the gap to new platforms. Yet, the $601 million price tag for a single deployment raises a sobering question: is the cost of clinging to aging warships worth the sacrifice of resources needed for the fleet of tomorrow?
As the Cape St. George prepares for its final mission, the Navy must confront this dilemma, balancing immediate needs with the long-term demands of a rapidly evolving maritime landscape. The answer will shape not just the fate of one cruiser, but the future of American naval power.
Bulgarian military