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Just over a year ago, I argued in The National Interest that the Russian victory against Ukraine’s 2023 summer counteroffensive would grant the Kremlin tremendous political capital. Moscow would be able to continue mobilizing Russian society and the economy to prosecute the war to the utmost. A Russian military that returned to maneuver warfare after exhausting the Armed Forces of Ukraine (AFU) could even enable a Russian victory “by the sword”, which would be a strategic and reputational disaster for the U.S. and NATO.
Facing intractable strategic and operational dilemmas, the Ukrainians attempted to alter the strategic balance in August by launching a lighting invasion of Russia’s Kursk region. This audacious and carefully prepared operation draws inspiration from German tactics in the latter stages of World War II. By then, the Germans would assemble ad-hoc Kampfgruppe, a battle group, from existing units, thus creating improvised veteran maneuver formations. The best example is the Battle of the Bulge, which used all remaining German armored and aircraft elements. As innovative as they were, the Kampfgruppe often drained German combat power faster than a purely defensive stance would have.
Today, the Ukrainians are doing much of the same, assembling an iron fist out of the remaining NATO-trained and equipped AFU brigades. As in World War II, assembling this fist comes at a steep cost. After several days of deep penetrations by Ukrainian mobile groups, the Russians scrambled special forces to cordon the invasion site, ceaselessly rained down missiles and drones on Ukrainian troops, and rushed in reinforcements. Fighting has again devolved into yet another positional, attritional struggle. Russian forces in Kursk are drawn from conscripts and uncommitted reserves, not the units fighting in the Donbas. Now the density of Russian troops, firepower, and defensive systems makes it difficult for the AFU to return to maneuver.
The U.S. and NATO are at a crossroads. The speed of the eventual Russian capture of Pokrovsk is the benchmark for the remaining offensive potential of the Russian military. Should the city fall after limited fighting, the Russians stand a good chance of returning to maneuver warfare and large territorial gains east of the Dnieper and beyond. A purely military Russian victory in Ukraine would normalize a vicious new status quo where conflicts are resolved “by the sword” without any room for U.S. and Western diplomacy and interests. From Iran and its Axis of Resistance, especially Hezbollah and the Houthis, to China in the Western Pacific, revisionist actors will become emboldened that all they need to do to win is to run out the clock on Western capabilities.
