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What the US Strikes on Iran’s Nuclear Program Means for NATO.
The strikes on Iran aimed to reassert existential deterrence, instilling fear, not just readiness, while pressuring NATO to evolve from transactional defense spending to credible strategic deterrence.
The United States’ show of force on June 22, 2025, in destroying much of Iran’s nuclear infrastructure also sends a message to NATO, and also to our other American great power adversaries in Beijing and Moscow. The message pertains to the distinction between transactional deterrence and existential deterrence.
NATO leaders, including US President Donald Trump, are now committed to an expansion of their defense spending to support Ukraine against continuing Russian aggression. The United States and NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte called for all members of the alliance to commit themselves to increased defense spending of five percent of each state’s gross domestic product (GDP).
How Will NATO Spend 5 Percent of Every Nation’s GDP?
Three and one-half percent of that increase was to be devoted to “hard” military purchases, such as weapons systems and urgently needed defense-related infrastructure. Further, an additional one and a half percent would be more flexible in its allocation of funds, but presumably still defense-related. Despite some grumbling from some members (ie. Spain), the alliance set a target date of 2032 for these fiscal commitments to be honored by all, although no one will be surprised if the date is extended to 2035.
Increases in NATO budgets for defense are certainly welcome. They should help to send a message of reassurance to Ukraine as it continues to fight for its survival, despite enormous losses of life among its armed forces and civilian population.
On the other hand, allocating more funds to Ukraine and increasing NATO’s budgets do not necessarily enhance the quality of deterrence. This is because there is a difference between transactional and existential deterrence.
Transactional deterrence refers to providing the military and political means for preparing for war, to avoid war, especially on unfavorable terms. But transactional deterrence can fall short of fulfilling the more ambitious requirements for existential deterrence, instilling fear in one’s enemies.
They should not only be impressed by your military potential for resistance to coercion or attack. Your prospective opponents should also fear that going to war with you will result in unacceptable losses to their military establishments and perhaps also to their regimes. In the case of enemies who are autocracies, their worst fears are of humiliation in a one-sided war that ends in a military coup or other national uprising against the regime.
The US Airstrike on Iran Was Meant to Be Deterrence
Existential deterrence of Iran was the objective of the US air campaign against the vitals of Iran’s nuclear program. Doubtless, some of its nuclear infrastructure and fissile material survived the strikes from American B-2 bombers and submarine-launched Tomahawk land attack missiles. But the inability of Iranian air defenses and reconnaissance to interdict any of the attacking bombs and missiles, as well as the overwhelming surprise provided by US operational security in planning and executing Operation Midnight Hammer, called into question the basic competency of the Iranian political and military leadership and, in all likelihood, will eventually lead to shakeups in the Iranian armed forces and security services.
In addition to its impact on Iran itself, the reaction of the Islamic Republic’s bedfellows in Moscow and Beijing was not reassuring to Tehran. A few diplomatic niceties were uttered for public consumption, but neither Russia nor China was prepared to put big military chips on the table for the ayatollahs.
Russia is sufficiently consumed with the war in Ukraine, and Russia’s profile in the Middle East has already taken a hit in the aftermath of Assad’s regime fall in Syria. China is primarily focused on its global economic ambitions and security interests in the Indo-Pacific region, particularly regarding Taiwan. Iran, under the duress of a war with Israel and an American “no nukes” enforcement policy, has no committed allies.
Time will tell, but the shake and bake of the Iranian regime and its nuclear program may involve spillover from transactional to improved existential deterrence concerning Russia and China. It should not be taken for granted that Russia and China will march to the same drumbeats on every critical issue; each has its interests to protect, and these are not necessarily identical. Smart diplomacy and information operations by the United States and others should keep Moscow and Beijing wary of their mutual vulnerabilities.
Can NATO move beyond an alliance that achieves transactional deterrence concerning Russia to one that also provides existential deterrence, thereby putting more pressure on Russia to negotiate a ceasefire and an enduring peace agreement to end the war in Ukraine? The possibility exists, but as noted below, NATO members must commit to instruments of influence beyond simply larger defense budgets. If it does these four things, NATO can increase its chances of crossing the strategy bridge from transactional to existential deterrence.
What Can NATO Do to Become Stronger?
First, NATO must invest in competitive, advanced technologies that will define who the great powers are and who the lesser, as we move forward in the twenty-first century.
Second, European members of NATO must also wean themselves from hyper-dependency on the United States for leadership. Of necessity, the US must provide for much of the muscle that underlies NATO’s military credibility. However, European members of NATO can and should take the initiative in specific areas, such as reinforcing NATO’s civil defense for protracted war and active defense against Russian “liminal” warfare, which includes covert actions and ambiguous aggressions. Related to this, NATO European states with nuclear forces should share a greater responsibility for deterrence at the high end of the conflict spectrum. In this regard, the UK’s announcement of its plan to purchase approximately 12 F-35A nuclear-capable aircraft from the United States is a crucial step in deterrence messaging.
Third, NATO should also train aggressively and visibly for an offensively minded strategic defense that will present the Kremlin with no attractive options and potentially embarrassing military setbacks.
Fourth, given that NATO is a coalition of democracies, public opinion must support an energetic deterrence agenda. This has two aspects: favorable sentiment in polls and on the streets for military and political steadfastness in the face of Russian coercion; and, second, a willingness among the necessary numbers of citizens to volunteer for military service.
Stephen Cimbala is a Distinguished Professor of Political Science at Penn State Brandywine and the author of numerous books and articles on international security issues.
Lawrence Korb is a retired Navy captain and has held national security positions at several think tanks and served in the Pentagon in the Reagan administration.
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National interest