Admiral warns of China’s naval shipbuilding surge over U.S.

On May 2, 2025, Admiral Samuel Paparo, commander of the U.S. Indo-Pacific Command, delivered a stark assessment of the naval balance between the United States and China, highlighting a significant gap in shipbuilding capacity that could reshape maritime power in the Pacific.

Speaking to McCain Institute’s annual Sedona Forum in Arizona, Paparo revealed that China produces two submarines annually for every 1.4 built by the United States and constructs six combatant warships each year compared to America’s 1.8.

His remarks underscore a critical challenge for the U.S. Navy as it seeks to maintain its edge in the Indo-Pacific, a region increasingly defined by strategic competition. The disparity in production rates, driven by China’s vast industrial base and state-driven policies, raises questions about the future of naval dominance and the steps needed to address this growing divide.

The United States has long relied on its technological superiority and global network of alliances to project naval power, with a fleet of 219 warships and 66 nuclear-powered submarines as of mid-2024.

The Virginia-class, built primarily by General Dynamics Electric Boat in Connecticut and HII’s Newport News Shipbuilding in Virginia, is a nuclear-powered attack submarine designed for multi-mission roles, including anti-submarine warfare, strike warfare, and intelligence gathering.

Measuring 377 feet in length with a displacement of approximately 7,800 tons submerged, these submarines are equipped with 12 vertical launch system tubes for Tomahawk cruise missiles, four 533mm torpedo tubes, and advanced sonar systems. Their stealth and endurance make them a critical asset in contested waters.

The Ohio-class, meanwhile, serves as the maritime leg of the U.S. nuclear triad, with 14 ballistic missile submarines carrying up to 20 Trident II missiles each, capable of delivering nuclear warheads with a range exceeding 7,456 miles. The Navy also operates four Ohio-class guided-missile submarines, each packing up to 154 Tomahawk missiles, providing significant conventional strike capability.

China’s submarine fleet includes the Type 094 Jin-class ballistic missile submarines and the Type 093 Shang-class attack submarines, both of which reflect Beijing’s push to modernize its undersea forces.

The Type 094, measuring 135 meters in length with a submerged displacement of around 11,000 tons, carries 12 JL-3 submarine-launched ballistic missiles, which have an estimated range of over 6,200 miles, capable of targeting the U.S. West Coast from the South China Sea.

Recent variants, such as the Type 093B, incorporate pump-jet propulsion and improved quieting technologies, narrowing the technological gap with U.S. submarines.

China also operates a significant fleet of diesel-electric submarines, including 20 Yuan-class and 10 Russian-designed Kilo-class boats, which are well-suited for operations in the shallow waters of the South China Sea.

The production disparity highlighted by Paparo stems from fundamental differences in the shipbuilding ecosystems of the two nations. In the United States, naval shipbuilding is concentrated in a handful of specialized yards, with Electric Boat and Newport News handling submarine construction and HII’s Ingalls Shipbuilding and Bath Iron Works in Maine producing surface combatants.

The U.S. Navy’s submarine production, currently at 1.4 boats per year, has been hampered by delays and budget overruns, with the Navy struggling to meet its goal of building two Virginia-class submarines annually.

Retired Navy Captain Jerry Hendrix, in an October 2024 statement, emphasized that submarine production has dropped to just over one per year, far below the Navy’s 30-year plan for three fast-attack submarines and one ballistic missile submarine annually.

China, by contrast, boasts a sprawling shipbuilding industry that integrates military and commercial production, providing economies of scale and flexibility. Major shipyards like Bohai Shipyard in Huludao, Dalian Shipbuilding, and Jiangnan Shipyard in Shanghai are state-owned and heavily subsidized, allowing rapid construction and modernization.

The China State Shipbuilding Corporation [CSSC], formed by the 2019 merger of CSSC and the China Shipbuilding Industry Corporation, oversees nearly 100 subsidiaries and research institutes, streamlining technology transfers and financing.

This civil-military fusion enables China to leverage commercial shipbuilding innovations, such as advanced propulsion systems and radar modules, for naval applications. A 2024 report from CSIS highlighted that 70 percent of Chinese warships were launched after 2010, compared to just 25 percent of U.S. ships, reflecting the speed and scale of China’s production.

The Type 055, one of the most advanced warships in China’s arsenal, is a focal point of its surface fleet modernization. Measuring 180 meters in length with a displacement of 13,000 tons, the Type 055 is equipped with 112 vertical launch system cells capable of firing anti-ship cruise missiles, surface-to-air missiles, and potentially anti-ship ballistic missiles. Its advanced radar and electronic warfare systems rival those of the U.S.

Navy’s Arleigh Burke-class destroyers remain the workhorse of the American fleet. The Arleigh Burke-class, built by Ingalls and Bath Iron Works, is 505 feet long with a displacement of 9,200 tons and carries 96 vertical launch cells for a mix of missiles, including Tomahawks and SM-6 interceptors.

The U.S. Navy’s production of 1.8 surface combatants annually, primarily Arleigh Burke-class destroyers and the new Constellation-class frigates struggles to keep pace with China’s output of six warships, which also includes the smaller but capable Type 054A Jiangkai II-class frigates.

Several factors contribute to China’s shipbuilding advantage. State ownership of shipyards eliminates the profit-driven constraints faced by U.S. private contractors, while lower labor costs and fewer regulatory hurdles accelerate construction timelines.

China’s centralized industrial policy prioritizes naval modernization, channeling resources into research and development for quieter submarines and more lethal warships. The integration of commercial and military production allows shipyards to share infrastructure, such as dry docks and skilled labor, reducing costs and delays.

A 2023 Department of Defense report projected that China’s submarine fleet could grow to 80 units by 2035, including a mix of nuclear and diesel-electric boats, while the U.S. fleet is expected to decline to 46 attack submarines by 2028 before recovering to 50 by 2036, assuming an optimistic production rate of two per year.

Paparo’s remarks also touched on the broader strategic context, particularly the potential for conflict over Taiwan. He expressed confidence that the U.S. would prevail in a hypothetical conflict due to its superior space-based capabilities and weapons designed to counter Chinese space assets.

This advantage, he argued, would offset China’s numerical edge in naval forces. However, he cautioned that the U.S. trajectory in shipbuilding and other critical capabilities is not keeping pace with China’s, a sentiment echoed in posts on X, where users noted the urgency of addressing this gap.

Historically, the U.S. Navy’s dominance has been rooted in its ability to innovate and project power globally. During World War II, American shipyards produced an unprecedented number of vessels, including 2,710 Liberty ships and 141 aircraft carriers, enabling victory in the Pacific.

This industrial might has since waned, with U.S. shipbuilding subsidies ending in 1981, leading to a decline in commercial shipyards and a reliance on a few naval-focused facilities. China, meanwhile, has followed a different path, building on Soviet technical assistance in the 1950s to establish a robust shipbuilding industry.

By the 1960s, China was producing Romeo-class submarines at a rate of six per year, and today, its shipyards account for over 50 percent of global merchant ship tonnage, according to a 2024 UN Trade and Development report. This commercial dominance provides a foundation for military production, allowing China to outpace the U.S. in both quantity and speed.

The PLAN’s growing presence in international waters, including joint exercises with Russia and operations near Japan, demonstrates its ambition to become a blue-water navy. The U.S., however, retains significant advantages, including a more experienced force, advanced technology, and alliances with nations like Japan, South Korea, and Australia.

Japan’s Maritime Self-Defense Force, with 34 destroyers and 10 frigates, and South Korea’s navy, with 16 frigates and 5 corvettes, could bolster U.S. forces in a conflict, potentially offsetting China’s numerical edge. The AUKUS agreement, signed in 2021, will further enhance this network by transferring Virginia-class submarines to Australia, expanding the undersea threat to China.

Efforts to address the U.S. shipbuilding shortfall are underway but face hurdles. The Navy’s Fiscal Year 2025 budget prioritizes $403 million for the submarine industrial base, with additional funds allocated for anti-submarine warfare and shipyard modernization.

China’s shipbuilding prowess, meanwhile, continues to grow, with plans to field 425 warships by 2030, compared to the U.S. Navy’s projected 300, according to a 2024 CSIS report. The PLAN’s ability to integrate dual-use technologies and maintain a younger fleet gives it a strategic edge in a prolonged conflict, where attrition and resupply would be decisive.

The naval competition between the U.S. and China is not just a matter of numbers but a test of industrial capacity, technological innovation, and strategic vision.

Admiral Paparo’s warning serves as a call to action, highlighting the need for the U.S. to bolster its shipyards, streamline production, and leverage alliances to maintain its maritime edge. While the U.S. Navy’s submarines and warships remain unmatched in capability, China’s rapid buildup threatens to shift the balance if current trends continue.

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Source. Bulgarian Military